PRICE DISCOVERY CHALLENGES IN THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY by Purcell, Wayne D.
Agricultural Outlook Forum 1999  Presented:  Monday, February 22, 1999 
 
 
PRICE DISCOVERY CHALLENGES IN THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY 
 
Wayne D. Purcell 






  The title of the session carries with it an implicit question, or perhaps that should be 
“questions.”  The rather apparent implicit question is one involving what price discovery will look like 
in the years beyond 2000.  An arguably less apparent implied question, but one on the minds of many 
astute observers of the livestock industries in this country, is whether there will be any significant price 
discovery function as we have traditionally known it in the years beyond 2000.   
 
  Price discovery is the dynamic interaction of buyers and sellers as they seek to find or to 
“discover” the market-clearing price.  By implication, this is a competitive process with well-informed 
buyers and sellers entering some type of marketplace infrastructure and executing their buy and sell 
objectives.  In the process of that give-and-take with what is admittedly less than perfect information, a 
market-clearing price is being discovered.  This is, of course, the process of interaction and/or 
negotiation that goes on at the various points of exchange along the continuum between the original 
livestock producer and the consumer of a finished product.  Separate and independently operated profit 
centers are usually involved at the production, processing, transportation, and retailing levels of 
economic activity in a price coordinated system featuring several points of exchange.   
 
  The vast research and educational literature dealing with the livestock and meats systems in the 
United States has been predicated on this type of market organization or structure.  There is separate 
ownership at the various levels of economic activity, and while these economic activities are technically 
related much as are the operating stations along an assembly line, they can be subjected to substantial 
separation or inconsistency in terms of goals, objectives, and operating norms.  The literature has 
always ascribed to the pricing system the job of coordinating these various levels of economic activity 
thereby ensuring that what is offered to the final consumers will in fact be consistent with their needs 
and/or preferences.  Price signals, premiums or discounts, are gleaned from the yes-no consumer 
decisions on a particular product offering by retailers, and those signals are sent back down through the 
complex chain of events to prompt producers to make any needed changes in the quality of their 
production.   
 
  The path along which those price signals are presumed to travel is, at best, a difficult 
communication path to follow.  There is the expected profit center mentality at each level of activity.  
Out of profit-maximizing goals and objectives comes an operating philosophy at each level that may or 
may not be consistent with what would be needed to accomplish high levels of coordination between 
what is demanded by consumers and what is offered by producers.  A myriad of governmental policies 
and programs has developed over time to help make this price coordinated system function, succeed, 
and survive.  There are market regulation policies in place, antitrust statutes that presume to influence 
firm conduct and performance of the system, and widespread programmatic activities to facilitate the 
workings of the pricing system.  Paramount in this latter category of facilitative policies and programs are the government's grades and grading activities, efforts in food safety, and significant programs to 
collect and disseminate economic planning and/or price and market-related information.   
 
The dual questions of how much price discovery activity will be seen and the form it will take 
in the years beyond 2000 may well be answered primarily by how effective current and future 
government programs of a facilitative nature turn out to be.  This, it would appear, is the interesting 
and important policy-related issue as we think about, anticipate, and plan for the new millennium.   
 
Changing Systems of Coordination 
 
  The efficacy of a price-coordinated system is going to be challenged in an increasingly complex 
global marketplace.  As production and processing technology becomes yet more sophisticated and as 
new and sophisticated merchandising programs are attempted, the traditional price-based system will be 
a focus of attention.  Whether it will be able to respond and maintain what remains of its historical 
position as a coordinating mechanism may well depend on what happens in our policy deliberations and 
decisions to change programmatic thrusts at the national level.  Boehlje, et al. talked about 10 major 
changes they see in a restructuring of food, fiber, and agribusiness industries in the U.S.  One of those 
10 that they identified was called "integration, coordination, and partnering."  The researchers 
summarized their thinking about the issue of control of the system as follows: 
 
"The fundamental issue of control of the system will result in significant new linkages 
between food firms, farmer/producers, and input supplier with the full range of 
acquisitions, joint ventures, and contractual and partnering arrangements being used.  
In many cases, the primary motivation for this more integrated system is to provide 
more accurate signals to producers and input suppliers as to what the ultimate end user, 
the consumer, wants in his food products.  Increasingly, the current spot market pricing 
system is not providing the detailed information consumers want on product attributes 
such as safety and residue-free products or consistency in quality, and other 
mechanisms for conveying this information are being used such as contract 
specifications."  (Boehlje, et al. p. 497) 
 
  In no sector of food and fiber systems are these issues and these questions of control more 
apparent than in the livestock industries.  Effective price discovery, it could be argued, refers to a well-
informed interaction between buyers and sellers with a capacity to attach a price or a price signal to 
product attributes of importance to the final consumer.  If the price signal type of communication 
system is to work and is to motivate change as needed at the producer level to keep the basic raw 
material aligned with the ultimate needs of the consumer, any value differences that would influence 
consumers yes-no vote on a product offering need to be identified and brought into the pricing process.  
In other words, if there is a need for quality categories one through five, then those five quality 
differentials have to be identified so each can have a price discovered for it as compared to an aggregate 
or averaging-type pricing process where those specific quality levels are not identified.   
 
  When Boehlje and his colleagues mentioned that some of the current spot or cash market 
pricing systems are not providing the detailed information that consumers want on issues such as 
consistency and quality, they likely had the livestock and meat sectors in mind.  The research literature 
has shown a substantial variation in eating satisfaction within the Choice grade for fresh beef, for 
example, across the past two decades.  In the 1990s, as the national trade organization in the beef 
industry prompted beef quality audits for both the years 1990 and 1995, it has become apparent that 
inconsistent quality is a major problem for the beef sector.  The professional meat scientists who 
organized and conducted these audits are indicating that one out of five, possibly one out of four, steaks from the Choice grade for beef is so tough as to block a reasonably satisfactory eating experience.  This 
is a classic case of market failure and has arguably been a major contributor to the problems of 
declining demand that have plagued the beef industry for two decades.  Analysis suggests that the 
demand for beef has decreased each year since 1979 or 1980 (Purcell, 1998). 
 
  Problems of a similar nature have plagued the other livestock-based meat products, specifically 
pork and lamb.  USDA grades that were historically employed in reporting market prices did not 
distinguish in any significant way for final values of pork carcasses in terms of leanness and/or eating 
quality.  As the large packer/processors started moving toward more of a merchandising mentality in 
their pork offerings and are into export markets, the lack of effective quality control became a major 
obstacle.  Slaughter hogs, offering different identifiable levels of quality, especially as reflected by 
leanness of cuts, were not identified separately and priced by the price-based marketplace.  To achieve 
the necessary control over quality and to avoid the merchandising problems associated with a highly 
variable quality of slaughter hogs coming to the marketplace, the processors have moved to control 
decisions on genetics, production management, rations, and health programs in their own or contract 
production arrangements.  Once a modicum of control over quality variation was accomplished, the 
processors started to make important new investments in product and market development and to 
position themselves to brand and stand behind the quality of fresh pork offerings.   
 
These systems in pork replace rather than complement the price-driven systems.  They are an 
explicit recognition that the pricing system has failed and that the marketplace featuring separate profit 
centers at the various levels of economic activity with price to accomplish the needed level of 
coordination has not worked.  As we move into the new millennium, we face the likely possibility that 
a majority of the pork produced in the United States will be produced under systems where there is an 
important element of control that is not price based.  Whether they are vertically integrated systems 
where ownership of two or more stages of economic activity is involved or whether the coordination is 
accomplished by contract specification, these are non-price means of effecting the coordination that the 
processors appear to be saying they must have to accomplish their objectives.   
 
In the beef system, the highly controversial captive supplies have been a response to the 
problems of variability in both quantity flows and quality of cattle.  Where contracts are involved to 
schedule cattle through the plant, the processors can manage the stability of their operating levels and 
try to keep costs down.  Increasingly, price grids or some set of premiums and discounts are being paid 
vis-à-vis some base price that is provided for in the contract.  Unfortunately, the pricing grid or set of 
premiums and discounts being employed varies across every buyer and even within a particular buyer's 
program depending on projected end use for the particular set of cattle.  This complicates any 
improvement in the level of coordination that a pricing system is able to achieve.  Even when a 
premium or discount schedule is employed, it typically is no more refined than dividing the Choice 
grade into high Choice and low Choice, and the widely documented variation in eating quality within 
the Choice grade is still not managed effectively.   
 
The vertical alliances that are emerging in the beef sector are another obvious attempt to get 
away from the problems of uncertainty that plague the price-coordinated system.  For decades, beef 
producers who are making the breeding decisions at the farm level and choosing the genetics that will 
determine the nature of the beef product have agreed that there is little or no price discrimination and 
little or no pricing to value.  There is a tendency to price on averages throughout the system from the 
sale of the small, weaned steer calf to the 1,200-lb slaughter steer and heifer coming out of feedyards.  
Indeed, in recent years that problem has arguably worsened as there is often a time window of only one 
to two hours during the week in which many of the cattle that are sold for that week are sold at essentially one average price.  This is not effective price discovery and is not the necessary condition 
for an effective price-based system of coordination. 
 
In an alliance, the producer can receive a calculated imputed value based on contribution of 
calves to the ultimate success of the coordinated program.  No visible pricing takes place, and there is 
no contribution to price discovery for the beef industry in its entirety.  The alliances are, it would 
appear, a predictable reaction to a failed pricing system that has not been able to discover prices 
consistent with value, a system that has been relegated to a system characterized by aggregating across 
value differences and trading cattle at virtually every level on price averages.  There is obviously no 
effective communication and no high level of pricing efficiency in a system where attributes of 
significant importance to the final consumer of the product are not identified and are not brought into 
the pricing process.   
 
The lamb industry in the United States has experienced demand decreases that may well parallel 
those that can be documented for beef.  The pricing system for live slaughter lambs has not only been 
ineffective and inefficient but has arguably been based on perverse incentives.  Within acceptable 
weight ranges, packers have always paid higher prices for lambs with higher dressing percentages.  
Yet, there is a widely researched and widely established negative correlation between dressing 
percentage and yield grade or the measure of lean cuts as a percentage of total carcass weight.  Not 
only was leanness, which is clearly an attribute consumers wanted to see, not being encouraged, it was 
actually being discouraged by the way the slaughter lambs were priced and valued.  This is not, of 
course, an effective system that will ensure that the needs and preferences of consumers are met by 
what producers offer over time.   
 
A Public Good Component 
 
  The industrialization of agriculture is increasingly widely discussed.  There have been 
congressional attempts to regulate the marketplace as buying processors in livestock get larger relative 
to selling producers.  Proposed legislation has ranged from dictating how buyers and sellers should 
transact their business to restricting the percentage of slaughter livestock that could be "captured" by 
any particular buyer in any particular market area.  Behind these well-meaning attempts is typically an 
interest in maintaining the type of structure that we have historically seen in rural America.  Careful 
perusal of a number of USDA policies ranging from payment limitations in the old farm bill programs 
to programs encouraging economic development, economic viability, and quality of life in rural 
communities suggests a bias toward an atomistic sector with independent family farms.  Typically, the 
view of that rural community that is explicitly or implicitly called for in some of these policy measures 
is one where independent, often family-based, farms are functioning as entrepreneurs and providing the 
bulk of the important raw material as it moves into processing in our food and fiber systems.  If there is 
to be something approaching an atomistic structure at the producer level, such that independent 
operating farmers and farm families can function in an entrepreneurial way and make the necessary 
contributions to a coordinated production and processing system, then the price discovery system must 
be effective.  The price signals have to be transmitted, and the price incentives that show up at the 
producer level must be recognizable, must be attached to product attributes that the producer's decision 
could influence, and they must be consistent with what the consumer wants and is willing to pay for.   
 
  Those conditions will not typically be met by for-profit firms pursuing a profit-maximizing 
scheme at the various levels of the system.  If there is a "public good" component to all this, it occurs 
when the public at large desires a particular end result and recognizes that the desired end result will 
only occur if the public is somehow involved.  We would never have had, for example, a standardized 
set of grades for feeder cattle or for slaughter cattle unless the public in the form of the USDA, a number of decades back, got involved and launched a grading system.  Paid for by the packers but still 
a voluntary system, quality grades for beef cattle have been around for many years, and yield grades 
identifying yield of lean cuts have been with us for some 30 years or more.  The last major change in 
the quality grades for beef goes all the way back to the 1970s when the marbling requirement to reach 
the Choice grade was substituted for, at least partly, by the youth of the animal.  The traditionally 
required increasing marbling as the animal aged within A maturity was eliminated.  Across the years 
there has been a growing, and now widespread, recognition that grades need to be modified and 
refined, at least to the point of bringing in a measure of tenderness, but no change has been 
forthcoming.  The Agricultural Marketing Service of the USDA provides this public service and 
contributes to this widely recognized public good, but it tends to be totally reactive in terms of grading 
specifications and any change in the system.   
 
  The grading service is seen by the USDA as a voluntary service, one which performs functions 
of importance and is needed by the industry.  Administrators expect to consider grading changes only 
when a strong request from the industry is forthcoming and preferably when there is a consensus across 
the industry and various industry participants with regard to the needed grading change.  But this is a 
standard that is very difficult to meet.  In the current system, all those cattle feeders who are feeding 
cattle of below average quality and selling them at essentially one average price are being paid too 
much for their cattle, often considerably too much.  Conversely, those cattle feeders who are producing 
above-average cattle are being paid too little.  Since the feedyard reflects the primary buyer of and 
demand for calves and feeder cattle, these same somewhat convoluted signals are passed down to 
producers.  There is no effective price communication, and some experts would argue that quality 
variation in fresh beef offerings is worse in 1999 than it was 20 or even 30 years ago.  Consumers who 
loudly proclaim they want a high-quality product, want consistency in the quality of that product and in 
their eating experience, and want convenience in preparation have largely been ignored.  Consequently, 
they have moved to other meats and other sources of proteins across the years as the product failure 
experiences in the fresh beef market have mounted and taken a major toll.   
 
A Look Ahead 
 
  As we approach the new millennium, the economic opportunities associated with a consumer-
driven product offering are too big to be ignored.  The three giant-sized packing firms in beef are all 
moving into value-added further processing--moves producers have hoped for since the 1970s.  Large 
pork processors have already made moves toward coordination and control, and some of these firms are 
moving into pork from a background in poultry.  The orientation toward new product development and 
quality control is what beef, pork, and lamb need, but these moves will prompt the continued demise of 
price-based systems.  Integration and contractual arrangements will often replace price as the 
coordinating mechanism, testimony to the inability of the price systems to prompt the needed quality 
control and needed changes in what is being produced at the farm level.   
 
  Trying to anticipate the nature of price discovery for livestock beyond 2000 is not a very 
fruitful exercise.  There will be price-driven systems, but they will be smaller than today and trending 
to even lower levels of importance.  This will happen because non-price means of control and 
coordination will appear both more effective and easier to adapt and use. 
 
  It is much more interesting to reflect on what policy postures we will develop and, related, the 
extent to which the public good dimension of price discovery is recognized.  Two directions are 
possible.  First, policies and programs to facilitate effective price discovery can be developed and 
pursued, but this will not happen unless there is a rapid move toward recognition of the public good 
component of price discovery.  The "market failures" in the livestock marketplace destroy the ability of independent farmers to compete.  A failure to discover price consistent with final use value pushes the 
livestock sectors toward integration, contracting, and other means of non-price coordination.  Alliances 
will grow to a position of importance, especially in beef, as producers and processors look for control 
and the opportunity to serve an identified consumer market.  This trend is in place, is powerful, and 
will not be denied unless there is a significant shift in public support of facilitative programs in areas 
like market news.  In addition, the willingness of governmental agencies to get out front and be 
proactive in areas like grades and grading will be very important.  Needed changes will not be 
prompted quickly by an industry pursuing profit objectives that pull in different directions.   
 
  The second alternative is to let the private initiatives run their course with little or no policy-
based effort to direct them.  Price discovery as we have known it will disappear quickly if this course is 
pursued or allowed.  It will linger in beef where integration and contracting is logistically more difficult 
but will move forward quickly in pork.  And where it persists, price discovery will take a different 
form.  Large packers will get involved, perhaps, in "discovery" of a base price for contracts and then 
apply a "price grid" of premiums and discounts.  The same base price might be extended to all sellers, 
with some pricing to value being accomplished via the grids.  This is not the traditional price discovery, 
but whatever form it takes in an industrialized livestock sector, it will be in the presence of other and 
non-priced means of coordination. 
 
  There is still time for some public choice, some control, over the direction the livestock sectors 
take.  A healthy research-based dialogue is needed if the choice of directions is not to be made by 
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questions:
1. What will price discovery be like beyond 2000?
2. Will there be any “discovery” in a traditional 
sense?Price discovery is the dynamic process of buyers and 
sellers seeking a market-clearing price.Price discovery is not the same thing as price 
determination.  To blame price discovery for $57 fed 
cattle and $8 hogs in late 1998 is much like attacking 
the messenger who brings bad news.If price is to be effective in coordinating what is 
produced with demands and preferences of 
consumers, the price discovery system must be able 
to develop and send to the producer clear “price 
signals.”  To do this requires the ability to price to 
value.  This is happening, especially in the beef 
sector. The ongoing decline in reliance on price-coordinated systems, 
a decline that will be at an exponential rate across the next 2-3 
years, is happening because of widespread market failure in 
the livestock sectors.  We do not have pricing to value, and 
price and the price discovery process cannot accomplish its 
assigned task of coordinating what is produced with what 
consumers want.
Pricing on averages
Product attributes important to consumers are not 
being identified and priced (tenderness)
Absence of quality control blocks consumer-driven
merchandising programsMarket failures are related to
v Profit center mentality
v Failure to see price discovery as a “public good”
v Failure, in public policies and programs, to facilitate the 
price discovery processIndustrialization of food and fiber coming at least partly 
because of price system failures
v Integration as non-price control
v Captive supplies and contracting
v Alliances as a means of non-price coordination and controlIf there is value in a “family-farm” structure with independent 
entrepreneurs in our livestock sectors, then price discovery 
has to be seen as a public good.  Grades and standards have to 
be modernized if the price-based systems are to accomplish 
the necessary level of coordination and give separate profit 
centers at the producing level a chance to compete with 
systems coordinated by management directive.  Price and 
market-related information that reflect the modern market-
place must be collected and disseminated to producers, and 
we must invest public dollars in better surveys and more 
complete coverage of all the ways livestock and meat are 
being sold, contracted, and delivered.The economic opportunities associated with moving to 
“consumer driven” are huge and will not be denied.  If price-
based systems cannot accomplish this, non-price means of 
coordination will fill the vacuum.  What price discovery will 
look like beyond 2000, how much of it will survive, and the 
economic and social fabrics of our livestock-producing 
communities will be largely determined by our public policies 
and programs in the next 5-10 years.  Collectively, we must 
consider policies and programs that give a marketplace 
characterized by separate ownership at the producer level a 
chance to compete.  